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1Abstract
We study the eﬀect of capital controls on the level of investment in
human capital and the resulting growth path of an economy. The econ-
omy consists of two groups of agents based on the ownership of factors
of production. One type of agents – called workers – own human capital
and bequeath education to their oﬀsprings. The other group of agents –
called capitalists – own and bequeath physical capital. The workers have
the political power to tax capital income. The capitalists, based on the
tax rate imposed by the workers and the capital control regime in place,
decide to invest part or all of their capital abroad. We characterize the
optimal tax behavior of the workers. We ﬁnd that higher capital con-
trols are beneﬁcial for investment in education whenever there is capital
ﬂight in a steady state equilibrium. However, higher capital controls are
shown to have no eﬀect on the tax rate on capital income imposed by
workers: rather, they act as a disincentive for capital ﬂight by lower-
ing the return from foreign investment. We show that lowering capital
controls can lead to higher growth only when there is no capital ﬂight
in the steady state. Importantly, to prevent capital ﬂight in the long
run, human capital accumulation must not show decreasing returns with
respect to education and the economy must be suﬃciently developed.
21 Introduction
This paper explores the implications of ﬁnancial capital ﬂight on redistribution
and human capital investments. Our research is motivated by a large corpus
of literature studying the association between inequality and growth. This
literature examines the eﬀect of income distribution on economic growth by
examining the impact of redistributive politics on physical capital investment
and/or human capital investment. Extensions of this literature incorporate
roles for redistribution, public ﬁnancing of education, capital market imperfec-
tions, non convexities in technologies, etc.
We focus on capital ﬂight particularly since this is an issue that tends to
plague countries with relative large inequalities and yet seems not to have re-
ceived much attention in the literature. We model an economy populated by
dynastic agents who have access either to physical capital or human capital.
Owners of physical capital have two alternative investment possibilities - in-
vesting at home or abroad. Investments abroad provide a secure return while
investments at home are subject to redistributive taxation. We examine the
optimal degree of taxation under these circumstances and the optimal degree of
capital ﬂight. This framework allows us to also revaluate the role of inequality
on redistribution.
Beginning with Perotti (1996), the empirical literature has failed to ﬁnd a
robust relationship between inequality and consequent redistribution despite
theoretical models continuing to rely on this link. However, these models ei-
ther tend to assume closed economies (Alesina and Rodrik (1994)) or avoid
physical capital altogether (Saint Paul (1993)). While Galor and Moav (2004)
incorporate physical capital and human capital accumulation in the process of
economic growth, their analysis is also based on a closed economy framework.
It does not take much to realize that once one allows the possibility of capital
3ﬂight, then even workers who do not earn a return from physical capital will
not necessarily want to tax at high rates since that would encourage further
capital ﬂight and reduce their own wages. Therefore the obvious link between
inequality and redistribution breaks down. This suggests the extent of redis-
tribution depending not just on the degree of inequality but also the openness
of the economy to capital ﬂows.
While the literature on the interaction between physical capital and human
capital and their eﬀects on economic growth is large, there are a few papers
that are directly related to our work. Galor and Moav (2004) examine the
relative importance of physical capital and human capital at diﬀerent stages
of economic development and looks at implications of inequality on economic
growth. They show that in the initial stages of development, physical capital is
more important and therefore inequality is beneﬁcial. In later stages as human
capital becomes more important, inequality is less beneﬁcial.
While it is not our attempt here to rewrite the various stages of develop-
ment after incorporating capital ﬂight, it is still useful to consider the implica-
tions of capital ﬂight on the stages of development. Our results suggest that
a less developed economy can actually end in either poverty traps with ab-
solutely no human capital accumulation or even growth traps with sustained
increases in inequality and a declining human capital to physical capital ratio
with permanent capital ﬂight. We ﬁnd that capital controls can be beneﬁcial to
under-developed countries for two reasons. First, they keep the level of domes-
tic investment high (and reduce capital ﬂight) which leads to higher domestic
wages, domestic income, and investment in education. Second, the endoge-
nous threshold required to jump to a balanced growth path is lowered with
higher capital controls. This makes it easier for an under-developed economy
to transition to a ‘high’ growth path.
Our work is also related to Bourguignion and Verdier (2000) and Viaene
4and Zilcha (2002a,b). For instance, Bourguignion and Verdier (2000) examine
the willingness of capital owners to fund public education. Their work, which
is a part of a larger literature on the transition from oligarchies to democracies,
examines the impact of capital ﬂight on the public funding of education. While
in a closed economy, oligarchs (who are assumed to be capitalists) may choose
to subsidize education, once the economy opens upto capital ﬂight, the same
incentive disappears and hence international ﬁnancial liberalization is bad for
education. In our paper this possibility of a development trap where there are
physical capital outﬂows and zero human capital emerges as a special case.
Moreover, we are more concerned with the incentives of the owners of human
capital to redistribute in the presence of international capital ﬂows. Hence, the
two papers are complementary.
Viaene and Zilcha (2002b) examine the role of government intervention in
raising human capital investments in a two country model. Their work focuses
on the issue of competition between governments in trying to garner a larger
share of output and the role of public education spending in the ﬁnal outcome.
However, Viaene and Zilcha (2002a) - which is more closely related to our work
- allows for heterogeneity in income across agents. Viaene and Zilcha (2002a)
ﬁnd that capital market integration does not aﬀect the long run growth rate
of an economy (when compared to the autarkic case), and that capital market
integration is always preferred by altruistic households even if later generations
lose and integration reduces income inequality in the country that experiences
outﬂows. These results are not the same as ours although modeling strategies
in both their model and our framework is quite diﬀerent. In particular, we
do not assume public provision of education. Further, income distribution
is modeled in terms of it functional distribution with diﬀerent groups acting
strategically. In contrast, Viaene and Zilcha (2002a) assume a continuum of
agents.
5The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we characterize the optimal
tax rate and its implications for capital ﬂight. In section 3, we consider the
transitional dynamics and derive conditions under which poverty traps and
balanced growth obtains. We conclude with section 4.
2 The Model




where Yt denotes output, Ht and Kt denote the aggregate amounts of human
capital and physical capital respectively, A>0 denotes a technological shift
parameter1,a n dγ ∈ (0,1). The economy consists of two types of agents called
capitalists - indexed by K - and workers - indexed by W, of equal measure.
The capitalists provide physical capital whereas the workers supply the human
capital in the production process. There are competitive markets for both
physical and human capital. The wage rate and rental rate are










In each time period t − 1, where t =1 ,2,....∞, a new generation of agents
are born who live for two periods at the end of which they are replaced by an
oﬀspring of their type. Each agent is born with a type of endowment. The
1Alternatively one can think of “A” as a parameter which captures the level of develop-
ment of an economy such as the state of legal institutions, ﬁnancial markets etc.
6capitalists are born with an endowment of capital goods, bK
t−1. Workers are
born with an endowment, bW
t−1, which they invest entirely in education, et:
i.e., bW





where θ ∈ [0,1]. We assume that both workers and capitalists become eco-
nomically active in the second period of their life: they only care about second
period consumption and leave a bequest for their oﬀspring.2
Workers have the political power to extract rents from the capitalists in the
form of a tax on capital income.3 In particular, in period t − 1, the workers
announce a tax rate, τt, to be imposed on capital income in period t.B a s e d
on the announcement of the tax rate at the end of period t−1, the capitalists
decide how much of their capital stock to invest at home and abroad. Let r
denote the world interest rate where r>1 which the capitalists take as given.
We assume that investment abroad is costly for the capitalists depending on
the capital control regime existing in the economy. For each unit of capital
invested abroad, the capitalists get a return of (r − φ). The parameter, φ,
denotes a measure of capital controls in the economy. In particular, φ =0 ,
corresponds to an economy without capital controls, while, φ = r, corresponds
t oac l o s e de c o n o m y .









2This makes the setup a warm glow model with one sided altruism.
3Later, we consider the case where there is electoral uncertainty where the capitalists can




t =( 1− τt)rtKt +( r − φ)(b
K





t +( r − φ)(b
K
t−1 − Kt),
respectively. We now characterize the optimal tax rate set by workers and the
resulting domestic investment undertaken by capitalists.
2.1 The Optimal Tax Rate and Capital Flight
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t denotes the consumption and income of the worker. The optimal







et =( 1− α)y
W
t .
Log utility implies that workers consume and bequeath a constant proportion
of their income.
The capitalist also faces a similar maximization problem as the worker.
The only diﬀerence with respect to the workers is that capitalists bequeath an
endowment of capital for their oﬀspring (as opposed to education). A capitalist
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t denotes the consumption and income of the capitalist. The









t =( 1− α)y
K
t .
Like the worker, the decision rules imply that capitalists also consume and
bequeath a constant proportion of their income. Note that as far as utility
of an agent is concerned, any policy that maximizes the income of an agent
also maximizes her utility. Given any capital income tax rate imposed by the
workers, the capitalist’s behavior is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Given any tax rate on capital income and domestic rental rate the
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Ht if rt(1 − τt)=r − φ
bK
t−1 if rt(1 − τt) > r − φ
(6)
Proof: The capitalists will allocate their investment home or abroad such that
their income is maximized. Maximizing equation (5) with respect to Kt gives
the expression above.
Lemma 1 characterizes the optimal investment rule by capitalists. Given the
domestic return to capital, tax rate, and the world interest rate, the capitalist’s
entire endowment is invested abroad if rt(1−τt) < r−φ. This implies that there
is complete capital ﬂight, and no domestic investment. If rt(1 − τt)=r − φ,
part of the endowment of capitalists is invested abroad and part of it invested
domestically. If rt(1 − τt) > r − φ, there is no capital ﬂight, as the domestic
after tax return to capital exceeds the world interest rate.
9Given the capitalist’s decision rule, we can now characterize the worker’s
optimal tax rate. The marginal product of capital schedule is shown in Figure
1. At any time period t, the pre-tax rental rate is a decreasing function of the
domestic investment, Kt. The maximum possible domestic investment is the
endowment of the capitalist, bK
t−1. The rental rate of capital at this level of
investment is denoted as   rt. It will turn out later that   rt plays a crucial role in
the optimal tax behavior of the workers. Equation (3) and (4) imply








Note that the entire rt schedule and   rt shifts upwards as the level of human
capital increases (see Figure 1). The next proposition characterizes the optimal
tax rate for the workers.
Insert Figure 1 Here.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, the workers set a tax rate such that the capitalist






0i f   rt ≤ r − φ
1 −
r−φ
0 rt if   rt > r − φ
(8)
Proof: The capitalists get a return of r − φ from foreign investment. Sup-






Ht. The income of the worker is
y
W









Hence, the tax rate that maximizes [(1−γ)+τtγ][(1−τt)γ]
γ
1−γ will also maximize
the worker’s income. Maximizing the expression, [(1 − γ)+τtγ][(1 − τt)γ]
γ
1−γ,
10with respect to τ implies that the optimal tax rate is zero. If   rt > r − φ,
the workers will set a tax rate up to a point where the capitalist is indiﬀerent
between investing at home or abroad. Hence the tax rate that maximizes a
worker’s income is given by the following condition:
  rt(1 − τt)=r − φ.
Note that Proposition 1 implies that the equilibrium tax rate is given by,















t−1 if   rt ≤ r − φ
bK
t−1 if   rt > r − φ
.
If   rt ≤ r−φ, the optimal tax for the workers is 0 and we have an interior solution
to the capitalist’s allocation problem between domestic and foreign investment,
i.e., maximization of equation (5) with respect to Kt.I f  rt > r − φ,w eg e ta
corner solution: the workers tax the diﬀerence between   rt and r−φ. Finally, we
rule out the case that r−φ =0 .I fr−φ = 0, then the capitalists have no other
option apart from investing at home. Accordingly, workers simply tax capital
income entirely, and the economy has zero capital stock from the next period
onwards. Since this is an uninteresting case, we assume that, r − φ>0.4
This fully characterizes the tax rate and the composition of investment in
equilibrium.5
4We later state a regularity condition to ensure that the capitalist’s endowment doesn’t
converge to zero.
5We also rule out any kind of capital inﬂow from the rest of the world. In case of perfect
world capital markets, the domestic capital stock will be pinned down by the equality between
the domestic return to capital and the world interest rate. In such a scenario, the workers
will always choose to impose a zero tax on capital in equilibrium. To make the political
11Figure 2 summarizes the tax chosen by the workers and the resulting invest-
ment behavior of the capitalists. Figure 2a shows that the amount of capital
ﬂight in an interior equilibrium. In Figure 2a, the marginal product of capital
schedule intersects the world interest rate r − φ and keeps falling so that   rt
is less than r − φ. In this case the optimal tax for the workers is zero. The
point of intersection between the rt schedule and r −φ gives us the amount of
domestic investment and capital ﬂight.
In Figure 2b, the rt schedule is decreasing but   rt exceeds the world interest
rate, r − φ. In this case the workers will tax capital until the capitalists are
just indiﬀerent between investing at home or abroad. Ex-post, this implies
rt(1−τt)=r−φ and there is no capital ﬂight. Note that Figure 2b shows the
optimal tax behavior of the worker in the case of a corner equilibrium.
This completely characterizes the tax behavior of the workers and the result-
ing allocation of capital between home and abroad at any given time period.
As to which case occurs depends on the capital-education ratio (which pins
down   r).
Insert Figure 2a and 2b Here.
3 The Dynamic Evolution of Education and
Capital
In this section, we characterize the transitional dynamics and the steady state
behavior of the economy. We show that whether balanced growth obtains de-
pends on whether θ =1 ,o rθ<1, respectively. We also derive an endogenous
economy aspect of the model more interesting, we allow for market imperfections in capital
inﬂows. In particular, we make the extreme assumption that there can be no capital inﬂows.
However, this can be relaxed without altering the basic intuition of the model.
12threshold relating the technology parameter, “A”, to the capital control para-
meter, φ. The endogenous threshold determines whether the worker’s income
and human capital accumulation matches the growth in income of the cap-
italists and the accumulation of capital. Importantly, we show that capital
controls can lead to a higher growth in education if the economy is at a lower
level of development.
3.1 θ =1
We ﬁrst consider the case where θ = 1. The capitalist’s income in equilibrium
is given by yK
t =( r − φ)bK
t−1, irrespective of whether   rt is less than or greater




t =( 1− α)(r − φ)b
K
t−1. (9)
The income of workers is given by,
y
W




























t−1 if   rt ≤ r − φ
(1 − α)[(1 − γ)+τtγ]A(bK
t−1)γ(et−1)δ if   rt > r − φ.
(10)
It is clear from equation (9) that the dynamics of the evolution of capital does
not depend on the parameter θ. However, the evolution of education given by
equation (10) depends on the value of the parameter, θ. The capitalist’s capital
endowment grows at the rate (1 − α)(r − φ). To ensure that the capitalist’s
endowment grows over time, we require the regularity condition: (1 − α)(r −
13φ) > 1.6 This implies that the capitalist’s endowment of capital grows at a
constant rate if the economy does not have any capital controls in place.













1−γet−1 if   rt ≤ r − φ
(1 − α)[(1 − γ)+τtγ]A(bK
t−1)γ(et−1)1−γ if   rt > r − φ.
(11)
The next proposition summarizes the steady state equilibrium growth rate of
education in comparison to the growth rate of capital.
Proposition 2 Let ge and gK denote the growth rates of education and capital,




IfA ≥ A(φ) there exists a unique balanced growth equilibrium where ge = gK =
(1 − α)(r − φ). If A<A (φ) then in the steady state, gK >g e.
Proof: Deﬁne the critical value of the capital-education ratio that yields an





1−γ.N o t e t h a t i f
bK
t
e ≤   bK
e , a corner solution
obtains. For a corner equilibrium, from Proposition 1 and equation (11), we




























e )ge =   bK
e , this implies that the maximum growth rate with
a corner solution for g∗
e is given by:
g
∗








6We can also think of this as an upper bound on the extent of capital controls, i.e.,
φ ≤ r − (1 − α)−1.
14Now we look at the case of an interior equilibrium. If
bK
t
e >   bK
e ,e q u a t i o n
(11) implies that the growth rate of education is given by, g∗









1−γ. From equation (9), gK =( 1− α)(r − φ). Let A(φ)b et h e
level of technological parameter where this condition, g∗





In the steady state, if A<A (φ), ge <g K: i.e., there will always be capital
ﬂight and the growth rate of education will be strictly less than the growth
rate of capital. However, if A ≥ A(φ), there exists a unique (bK
e )r a t i os u c h
that ge = gK =( 1−α)(r−φ): i.e., in the steady state, there will be no capital
ﬂight.
Insert Figure 3a and Figure 3b Here.
These cases are depicted in Figures 3a and 3b. In particular, Figure 3a shows
the steady state equilibrium when A>A (φ). The growth rate of education
is an increasing function of capital-education ratio. It reaches a maximum
at   b
e after which it becomes constant as we have capital ﬂight. The growth
rate of capital is always equal to: (1 − α)(r − φ). When A>A (φ), these
two curves intersect at a unique capital-education ratio, b




e, then the capital-education ratio,
b






e, falls. This implies that the steady state equilibrium
is unique and stable with both capital and education growing at the same rate.
In the steady state, we always have a corner solution with no capital ﬂight.
Figure 3b shows the steady state equilibrium when A<A (φ). Here, irre-
spective the initial capital - education ratio,
b0
e0, the growth rate of education
never catches up with the growth rate of the capital stock. Eventually the
domestic rental rate falls to a point where there is capital ﬂight. This leads to
15unbalanced growth: i.e., to a situation in which gK >g e in the steady state.
If we interpret the
b
e ratio as a measure of inequality, then in steady state in-
equality keeps increasing. The income of the capitalists in comparison to the
income of the workers also keeps increasing forever.
Proposition 2 suggests that capital controls are good for an economy when
the level of technology is very low. However, when technology reaches a certain
threshold capital controls can be harmful for growth. To see this intuitively,
consider the case where A>A (φ), under which the worker’s optimal tax is a
corner equilibrium (in terms of Figure 2b). When φ rises (capital controls rise)
the worker’s optimal tax on capital income increases. This lowers the after-tax
income of capitalists in the next period and leads to lower domestic investment,
K, as well as a reduction in the growth rate of capital, gK. This reduces
steady state wages and the income of workers, leading to lower investment
in education. Therefore, a rise in φ leads to a lower capital-education ratio
as well as lower equilibrium growth rates of education and capital. As such,
a reduction in φ as long as A>A (φ) facilitates the transition to the high
equilibrium growth rate. This is because the level of technology is suﬃcient
to sustain balanced growth, implying that developed countries do not require
capital controls.
When A<A (φ), an interior equilibrium obtains and the optimal tax set
by workers is zero. A rise in φ has two eﬀects: ﬁrst, it reduces capital ﬂight
which increases the domestic capital stock and wages, leading to higher income
for the workers. This leads to more investment in education as well as a higher
growth rate of education, ge (even though ge <g K). Figure 4 shows the eﬀect
of a change in φ on the gK and ge curves. Note that A(φ) is falling in φ.T h i s
implies that a rise in φ reduces the threshold required to jump to the balanced
growth equilibrium. In this sense, increasing capital controls when a country
is underdeveloped may be good, as it relaxes the constraint required to achieve
16the high growth equilibrium.
Insert Figure 4 Here.
Interestingly, in an interior equilibrium, the channel through which capital
controls aﬀects growth is not through the equilibrium tax rate. This is because
the optimal taxes for workers are zero. A change in φ only aﬀects the proportion
of the capitalist’s endowment invested domestically and abroad. This aﬀects
the wages of workers and their income which leads to changes in investment
in education. Importantly, the channels through which changes in φ aﬀect
equilibrium growth depends on whether a corner or interior equilibrium obtains
in steady state.
3.2 θ<1
We now consider the case where human capital is concave with respect to in-
vestment in education i.e., θ<1. The results are summarized by the following
lemma.
Lemma 2 Given any initial endowment of capital, bK
0 , and education, e0,t h e r e
exists a time period t  such that   rt < r − φ for all t ≥ t .
Proof: We show that in the steady state there is some capital ﬂight even if the
economy starts oﬀ from a point where the domestic pre-tax rental rate exceeds
the return from foreign investment for the capitalists. From equation (10), the
evolution of education is given by




δ if   rt > r − φ.
From Proposition 1, we know that the optimal tax rate on rental income is
given by, τt =1−
r−φ
0 rt . Using (7) and (10), we can write the evolution of
education as




δ − (r − φ)b
K
t−1].
















When the growth rate of education, ge, exceeds growth rate of domestic capital,
(1 − α)(r − φ), the capital-education ratio, bK
e , falls in the next period. In
addition, the term e
(θ−1)(1−γ)
t−1 → 0i fge > (1 − α)(r − φ). Hence, in the steady








decreasing over time. Hence, there exits a t  such that   rt < r −φ for all t ≥ t .
Lemma 2 says that irrespective of whether the initial world interest rate is
less or greater than the initial domestic interest rate, an interior equilibrium
obtains in the steady state in which optimal taxes are zero. Hence, when
human capital is concave with respect to investment in education, an interior
equilibrium obtains with a unique constant steady state level of education. In
the next proposition, we characterize the unique steady state level of investment
in education.
Proposition 3 In the steady state, the unique constant steady state level of















and is independent of the initial endowments.
Proof: From Lemma 2, it follows that the economy eventually reaches a point
when   rt < r − φ. From (10), the evolution of education is given by











Education in period t is a monotonically increasing concave function of the
previous period’s education. In the steady state, et = et−1 = e∗. Hence, the















18The intuition behind Proposition 3 operates similar to the case where θ =1
and A<A (φ)w h e r ear i s ei nφ induces a growth eﬀect on the growth rate of
education. Here a rise in φ has a level eﬀect with the steady state equilibrium
growth rate being zero. To see this, suppose there is an increase in φ.S i n c e
the unique steady state equilibrium level of income is at an interior point, this
implies that the optimal tax for workers is zero.7 Therefore, a rise in φ raises
domestic investment, K, by the capitalists, and induces lesser capital ﬂight.
Since the domestic stock of capital increases, workers wage incomes increase
leading to more investment in education. Hence, a higher φ - or more capital
controls - lead to greater investment in education. Figure (5) depicts this.
Starting at e∗,ah i g h e rφ moves the steady state to e∗∗.
Insert Figure 5 Here.
3.3 Extensions and Discussion
Our model can easily be extended to allow for the possibility of regime changes
between the capitalists and workers. Consider the case where the workers have
already set a tax rate, and a capitalist government comes to power. Suppose the
capitalist government can change the capital control regime: i.e., set φ,g i v e n
τ. From equation (9), we know that the workers set the tax rate such that the
capitalist’s make a return just equal to r − φ. This means that the capitalists
are always better oﬀ by liberalizing the capital account: that is, set φ =0 .
From Figure 5, we know that as φ falls, there is a sudden decline in investment
in education, and the economy converges to a lower steady state equilibrium.
This holds for both the case where θ<1a sw e l la sθ =1w i t hA<A (φ). Even
in the case θ =1w i t hA<A (φ), a suﬃciently large reduction in φ - because








19A(φ) is decreasing in φ - would move the economy to an unbalanced growth
equilibrium. Capital account liberalization yields the high growth equilibrium
provided that the economy is suﬃciently developed.
Finally, suppose the workers have the option of engaging in some subsistence
production activity, like home production. In the case where the returns from
ﬁnal good production are suﬃciently high, the workers will never engage in
subsistence production. The workers invest their entire bequest in education,
and the model is identical to the analysis outlined above. If the returns from
subsistence production are suﬃciently high, then the workers would not invest
in education. Capitalists would not invest at home. And the economy is in a
low productivity equilibrium where only home production occurs.
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper constructs a heterogenous agent model to study the eﬀect of the
capital controls on the level of investment in human capital and the resulting
growth path of an economy. Our analysis leads to several interesting impli-
cations. First, after characterizing the optimal tax rate, we ﬁnd that higher
capital controls are beneﬁcial for investment in education whenever there is
capital ﬂight in a steady state equilibrium. This is because higher capital con-
trols increase the proportion of investment undertaken domestically (relative
to capital ﬂight), thereby raising domestic wages, income, and investment in
education. We derive an endogenous threshold relating the technology para-
meter to the degree of capital controls. A suﬃciently developed economy –
associated with a high level of technological progress – induces a steady state
balanced growth path in which education and capital growth at the same rate.
However, an under-developed economy can jump to the balanced growth path
for a suitably chosen value for the capital control parameter, as higher capital
20controls reduce the requisite exogenous technological progress required to in-
duce a balanced growth path. This is because higher capital controls increase
domestic wages and income inducing higher investment in education. This
diminishes the relative contribution required by exogenous increases in tech-
nological progress to raise income and investment in education. Accordingly,
capital controls can be beneﬁcial to economies that are not developed. Finally,
we also show that to prevent capital ﬂight in the long run, human capital ac-
cumulation must not show decreasing returns with respect to education and
the economy must be suﬃciently developed.
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Figure 3a: Steady State with θ = 1   
A > A(φ ) 
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Figure 3b: Steady State with θ = 1 
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Figure 4: Change in Capital Controls φ>   φ ′
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Figure 5: Steady State with θ < 1   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 